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Economic Policy and State Owned Enterprises: Evolution Towards 
Privatisation in India 
Madhu Bala 
State Intervention and Economic Development 
State intervenes in the economic development of an economy in a variety of ways within the 
contours of socio-economic and political circumstances. A government may intervene in the 
process of economic development mainly in two different ways. It controls and regulates the 
private sector while abstaining from undertaking direct production through enacting suitable 
economic policies. Alternatively, it prefers to undertake production but refrains from imposing 
controls on the private sector. The former is referred to as controlling state while the latter as 
producing state. However, in practice, a state is a mixture of both. Whatever may have been the 
historical tradition, it is seen that state intervention has induced, improvised, restrained and 
conditioned a variety of structural transformation in the economy, especially in the industry.  
Theoretically, two broad conjectures are recognised on the nature of state intervention in a 
Capitalist economy. The first may be described, in the words of Paul Sweezy (1991), as the 
'class-mediation theory' while the second would be 'class-domination theory' (p.243). "Class 
mediation theory takes the existence of a certain class structure for granted, and sees in the state 
an institution for reconciling the conflicting interests of various classes; class domination theory, 
on the other hand, recognises that the classes are a product of historical development and sees the 
state as an instrument, in the hands of the ruling classes, for enforcing and guaranteeing the 
stability of the class-structure itself." Between these two broad strands, there are several 
versions, dominant among them being the 'Stamocap theories' (Jessop 1982). "These theories 
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assume a particular stage of capitalism characterised by fusion of monopoly forces with the 
bourgeoisie state which, in fact, becomes a single mechanism of economic exploitation and 
political domination" (Jessop 1982, p.32). Without going into the details of these debates within 
Marxist and Liberal traditions, it is suffice to say that any prior theoretical construction on the 
nature and character of state intervention in a country would be restricted by the practical 
experience of the state in that particular economy depending upon spatial and temporal 
conditions. In different nation-states, the state intervenes in different ways at different points in 
time, conditioned by a plethora of socio-economic and historical factors. Consequently, uneven 
capitalist development follows. In this process, some states emerge as advanced or independent 
while others as subordinated, colonised or dependent. To mark this distinction, theoretical 
literature is presented in 'dependency perspective' (Bottomore 1987, pp 115-17 and 500-3), 
particularly by Cordoso, Dos Santos, Paul Baran, AG. Frank and Samir Amin. 
The intervention of state would be different in an advanced country as compared to that in a 
colonial or post-colonial economy. Different scholars have advocated various ways through 
which state can intervene in an advanced capitalist economy. Since Adam Smith advocated 
Laissez-faire capitalism, restricting the role of the state to defence, administration, justice and 
public works only; academic opinions changed and many economists favoured a varying degree 
of state intervention. Marx discussed state intervention in terms of classes and class-relations. In 
Keynes' and Kalecki's works, state intervention is not restricted to the provision of financial and 
infrastructural support but also of correcting the system whenever there is crisis thus leading to a 
crisis-free capitalism. Keynes believed that state intervention in itself would be a sufficient 
condition to deal with the crisis-ridden economy. But he did not recognise the tendencies of 
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recurrent crisis inherent in a system. Kalecki recognised this and analysed it in terms of business 
cycle and political business cycle1. 
State Intervention in a Developing Economy is of different nature. The underlying assumption is 
that in a developing country, the market mechanism systematically misallocates resources 
between different uses at a given point in time and therefore capitalist state seeks recourse to 
state intervention, especially for setting the prices right. State intervention in the colonial 
economy was mainly assisting metropolitan industries in their export expansion activities on the 
Indian market. Government intervention, therefore, did not generate the basic conditions for a 
wider development of domestic private enterprise. The development of industrial capital took 
place 'in spite of', rather than, 'because of' state intervention (Bagchi 1982). In the post-colonial 
regime of a country, the twin problems of industrialisation and development necessitate a fair 
degree of active state intervention. India's situation throws up many interesting insights in this 
regard that we shall discuss as the present paper progresses. 
State owned enterprises - An Instrument of State Intervention  
As mentioned earlier, the state does intervene in the industrialisation of an economy depending 
upon a host of initial conditions. The formation of state capitalist or state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) for the production of goods and services is one manifestation of such an intervention. 
One may not discover a uniform set of reasons as to why such enterprises have been created in 
different countries. In some cases, their creation is attributed to the discernible limitations of 
market mechanism particularly when domestic capitalism is still in a nascent stage and private 
enterprise is weak. In some other cases, it is a deliberate response to the historically determined 
 4
relationships perceived by many post-colonial societies. Yet in some other cases, their origin is 
grounded in ideology- the ideology of socialism.  
Thus, the rationale for establishing state capitalist enterprises stems from the imperfections in the 
product as well as factor markets, lack of information and reluctance on the part of private 
entrepreneurs due to high risk and low returns (Gillis 1980). Moreover, in order to earn revenue, 
governments prefer to own monopolies, nationalised industries especially in public utilities, 
railways and communications. 
In many developing countries, state enterprises are assigned the responsibility of fulfilling 
specific social goals, which have their origin in colonial period. Correcting regional and 
economic imbalances, providing employment and reducing the concentration of monopoly 
power in the economy are a few obvious examples. As a pre-requisite for balanced growth, the 
state controls the key sectors of the economy. This argument is popularly known as 'commanding 
heights' rationale and is normally associated with the ideology.  
Whatever may be the idea behind the creation of such enterprises, they come into existence 
either by direct state investment or through nationalisation of private enterprises. The state 
intervenes through state owned enterprises in the countries where investment needs for different 
projects are large and the expected returns at least in the short run are too low to motivate private 
capital to invest. 
In brief, we find various socio-political-economic and historical rationales, all different, but often 
entwined with each other for the creation of state owned enterprises. Hence, any research study 
aiming to evaluate the economic policies and the role of state sector in an economy cannot be 
 5
separated from the general polity and social background of that economy. Also, it is imperative 
to go beyond an overall evaluation of state sector as a whole and to disaggregate it for the 
purpose of analysis. The dis-aggregation becomes all the more important if we have reasons to 
believe that (i) the performance is not uniform across the entire spectrum of state owned 
enterprises and that (ii) the state owned enterprises are not inherently inefficient. 
Since 1980, the intervention by the state through state owned enterprises has been undergoing a 
close scrutiny in many developing countries including India. Due to tremendous fluidity of 
finance capital, governments found themselves struggling with fiscal deficits and making it 
increasingly difficult to raise funds at home and abroad. The state capitalist enterprises were 
absorbing a large chunk of government funds in the form of subsidies, which has resulted in the 
misallocation of resources brought about by diversion of savings. So there was a hunt for 
remedies in the developing economies and recourse has been found by most of them including 
India in the form of deregulation, liberalisation, contracting out and franchising.  
In his endeavour to develop a theory of economic growth that takes root in the economic and 
political realities of the late capitalist society, O'Connor (1973) points out that, the capitalist state 
must accomplish two basic but contradictory functions - accumulation and legitimisation. It 
means that the state must create conducive environment for the capitalist accumulation. It must 
also generate conditions for social harmony2. These two concepts point out at two significant and 
inter-related aspects of social reality.  
Various approaches have been suggested for the evaluation of state enterprises and thus making a 
case for privatisation; major among them being: (i) financial profitability and (ii) social 
profitability using accounting prices. The former approach in itself is not a sufficient condition to 
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frame judgement on economic performance. As Chokshi (1979) points out, "Any general 
comparison between state owned and private enterprises based on the use of financial efficiency 
(profitability) is not meaningful as no two enterprises operate in precisely comparable 
circumstances". Many of the state capitalist enterprises fail either due to faulty planning or due to 
excess capacity created or because of the non-optimal choice of location, which serve the 
purpose of regional development. Similarly, excessive political interference and lack of 
managerial interests (autonomy) hamper the performance of state enterprises. Based on the 
above strands of thinking, there are various theories on assessing the performance of state 
enterprises.  
One of them is 'property rights theory', developed by Armen Alchian, Ronald Coase, and Harold 
Demsetz,, which explains differences in organisational behaviour solely on the basis of the 
individual incentives created by the structure of property rights. In this view, property rights 
specify the social and economic relations that people must observe with each other in their use of 
scarce resources, including not only the benefits that owners are allowed to enjoy but also the 
harms to others that they are allowed to cause. A right of ownership actually comprises several 
rights, chiefly the rights to use an asset, to change it in form, substance, or location, and to 
transfer all or some of these rights. In so far as the state restricts these rights; they get diluted. 
Thus “the key issues for the theory are, first, to whom are property rights assigned? and second, 
how, if at all, are they attenuated?” (Starr 1988). 
The theory holds that the form of ownership is the predominant explanation for the varying 
performance of different organisations. It takes the market as the standard for judging value and 
finds state owned institutions deficient because they fail to measure up to that standard, e.g., their 
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"shareholders" cannot sell stock and finally it assumes that the market for corporate control is 
highly efficient and that the chief reason corporations are acquired is their management's poor 
performance. (Starr 1988). 
Another theory revolves around the political dynamics. It takes the strand that state owned sector 
is exposed to political manipulations. State Capitalist enterprises are an instrument of 
intervention in the hands of politicians in developing countries but hidden from public 
surveillance. The presence of coalition groups is a factor responsible for the poor performance of 
state enterprises, which serve as a source of power in the hands of bureaucrats and managers. 
The theory owes its origin to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), “who apply the logic of 
microeconomics to politics and generally find that whereas self interest leads to benign results in 
the market place, it produces nothing but pathology in political decisions” (Starr 1988). Similar 
to property rights theory, the public choice theory assumes individualistic model of human 
behaviour and postulates that (1) democratic polities have inherent tendencies toward 
government growth and excessive budgets; (2) expenditure growth is due to self-interested 
coalitions of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats; and (3) state owned enterprises necessarily 
perform less efficiently than private enterprises. 
Both property rights and public choice theories basically deal with the reassignment of rights. 
There is another perspective in economic theory that deals with relocation of economic functions 
as given by neoclassical economists. According to them imperfect information, externalities, 
increasing returns to scale, and inequalities of wealth prevent the market from achieving optimal 
performance. Thus when the market fails, some form of public ownership or regulation is 
justified. But as public choice theory has successfully risen the challenge ‘where as markets fail, 
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so, does the government’; indeed, the theory suggests that government's performance will only 
be worse. Charles Wolf (1979), refer it as "non-market failure.'' Thus the theory maintains that 
both markets and states have their weaknesses and thus according to this perspective, 
privatisation becomes a way to move activity from a less efficient to a more efficient form--a 
tool of economic adjustment rather than radical reconstruction (Yarrow 1986). 
There is yet another theory, which is most widely discussed in the literature of industrial 
organisation and revolves around the superior efficiency of the markets, which are characterised 
by effective competition among firms.  
Thus there exist near universality of the attack on state from both ends of political spectrum—
Marxists and non-Marxists. Marxists critics of the role of state intervention find state as the 
captive of capitalist interests (Miliband 1969), existence of unproductive labour in state services 
sector (Gough 1979), and the tendency of government spending to exceed government receipts 
under the demands both from capital and labour for state funds and resistance to taxation 
(O’Connor 1973). Mainstream arguments claim that services including state services tend to be 
unproductive (Bacon and Eltis 1976) and that as economies progress, social security schemes 
tend to reduce aggregate capital accumulation (Feldstein 1974). 
Hence all the theories and viewpoints are informative of the general theoretical case for 
privatisation. Special concerns are level of capitalist development, presence of coalition groups, 
managerial incentives and competitive forces. However, whether it is the level of capitalist 
development or the presence of coalition groups, state intervention through state owned 
enterprises will depend upon the social fabric of a given society. As Shepherd (1976) comments, 
"whether or not state owned enterprises does reasonably well in financial terms seems to be more 
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a function of country concerned than of economic sectors or organisation of the enterprise". It is 
not fair, however, to expect any single theory to encompass all aspects connected with the 
performance of state owned enterprises. 
Economic policy and the posture on state owned sector 
To reiterate, economic policy making by the state requires balance of accumulation and 
legitimisation. Generally, the adopted economic policy serves the interests of a few major social 
groups. These dominant social groups react to the adopted policy and their reactions are 
normally taken into account while amending the existing policy or making the new economic 
policy. Thus in the process, a balance of accumulation and legitimisation is sought out. 
The proper understanding of the economic policy of an economy like India necessitates its 
historical evaluation. Therefore, in this paper, the whole period of interaction of economic policy 
and state owned sector in the post-independence India has been divided into following four 
phases: (i) 1950-1965, (ii) 1966-1984, (iii) 1984-91 and (iv) post-1991 policy regime. During the 
first phase, i.e. 1950-65, the growth rates of the economy were generally high and state owned 
sector was occupying the position of 'commanding heights'. The second phase (1966-84) has 
been further sub-divided into two periods 1966-73 and 1973-84, because of various factors, 
discussed later in detail. Although the economy passed through a crisis during this phase, the 
state owned sector was by and large still enjoying a significant position. The second sub-period, 
i.e. 1973-84 recorded a slow process towards liberalisation, which culminated into an irreversible 
process of liberalisation of the economy through the third (1984-91) and during final phase (1991 
onwards) of our study of the economic policy in India. In the present phase, state owned sector, 
no longer occupies the position of commanding heights. In addition, the old concept of socialism 
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and mixed economy are replaced by the concepts such as liberalisation, privatisation, 
disinvestment and market-friendly approach. 
Hence, these four phases of the economic policy making will enable us to understand the logic 
behind the establishment of state owned sector and assigning it the role of commanding heights; 
the subsequent change in thinking and the reasons behind such a change in policy. 
First Phase (1950-65) 
To begin with, in 1947, it was mainly the ideology of socialism that led the state owned sector to 
play a significant role in the rapid development of the economy. However, at that moment, it was 
very difficult to deny the existence of big monopoly capitalists. Consequently, the economy was 
essentially a mixed one comprising of both state owned and private industrial sectors. Two 
Industrial Policy Resolutions of 1948 and of 19563 were adopted during this period. Both these 
resolutions acknowledged the role of the private sector but excluded it from the basic and 
strategic sectors of the economy reserving them exclusively for the state owned sector. Many 
arguments were put forward in support of the role assigned to the state owned sector e.g. the 
provision of infrastructure for private sector; long gestation period of basic and strategic 
industries, lack of adequate funds in the hands of private sector to establish such industries. 
Private sector enterprises also welcomed this move on the part of the government, as they wanted 
protection against the national and foreign monopolists (Shirokov 1973). 
State owned sector was not only serving the path to socialism of the future but also the 
mechanism to bring about India's industrialisation and modernisation. The economic strategy 
adopted in support of this argument was extensive import-substitution programme with a lot of 
emphasis on heavy industry and capital goods industry. This strategy was followed in the second 
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five-year plan under the aegis of Mahalanobis heavy industry model and was carried on through 
the third five-year plan. The various instruments of this entire programme were centralised 
economic planning, heavy public investment, high protection tariffs and licensing policy. 
However, state owned sector was not the only part of total project adopted in the Nehruvian era. 
The other important part was land reforms. It will be out of context to go into the details of this 
aspect. Suffice to mention here that the land reform measures adopted failed largely due to the 
lack of political will. In the opinion of some researchers, the ruling party proved to be a 
hindrance rather than help substantiating the argument that when interests of the important social 
groups are at stake, ideology loses its usual verve. “All these developments ultimately meant that 
the project of socialist society was reduced to a project of industrialisation with state owned 
sector being assigned the important role” (Mehta 1989). 
Thus, in terms of Kalecki's 'intermediate regime', one can infer that economic policy of the 
'Nehruvian era' was more a reflection of the aspirations of the urban middle classes. However, at 
the same time, it reflects the weaknesses of big monopoly capitalists in urban areas and power of 
the rich rural strata during that particular period. 
Second Phase (1966-84) 
The first phase of economic policy making registered a satisfactory industrial growth with a 
policy of import-substitution and self-reliance. It was only because of Indo-China war of 1962 
and the Indo-Pak war of 1965 that India had to ask for foreign aid and consequently it came 
under the pressure of international agencies like the World Bank and IMF. This process was 
further aggravated by the agricultural crisis of 1965-67, when it experienced the worst drought. 
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There were conscious efforts on the part of the policy makers and political leaders to bring about 
a change in the economic policy and a different strand was taken. The emphasis was more on 
agriculture. (It was during this period that the adoption of the HYV strategy resulted in the Green 
Revolution in some parts of the country) rather than on heavy industry and massive state owned 
sector investments. In order to correct the balance of payments problem, rupee was devalued in 
June 1966. However, these changes could not solve the prevailing economic crisis. Inflation rate 
was alarmingly high and subsequent years witnessed serious budgetary crisis, which effectively 
put an end to the heavy industry strategy and a decline in state capitalist or public investments 
manifested itself in the slower growth rates of industrial output in Indian economy. 
It was natural, therefore, that retrogression in the rate of growth of Indian economy that started in 
the mid-sixties, reached alarming proportions by the early seventies. Over the years, this slowing 
down of industrial growth rate generated a lively debate among the scholars who offered many 
explanations (Varshney 1984). One among all these explanations was declining public 
investment and infrastructural bottlenecks expounded by Bardhan (1984). He discussed this 
argument in two steps, i.e. (i) a decline in public investment and rising capital-output ratios were 
strongly related to the deceleration in Industrial growth; and (ii) these causes owe their genesis to 
the heterogeneous and conflicting nature of India's dominant coalition.  
Because of this entire experience over a period of almost five years, i.e. 1964-69, the government 
reversed back to the radical conjecture that ensued with the nationalisation of banks in 1969 and 
the enactment of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. This shifting from 
one stand to another was more a reflection of the politics of populism rather than a consistent 
strategy of growth. The experience of oil shock of 1973 and the realisation, on the part of 
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government that the radical approach with its restrictions on private sector and relentless 
expansion of the state owned sector had not helped the growth of the economy; on the contrary, 
it had coincided with economic stagnation and inflation (Marathe 1986). 
Consequently, the economic policy of the government took a turn towards liberalisation. New 
Industrial licensing policy was announced in 1973 with its partial liberalisation programme. 
Several concessions were granted to Indian as well as foreign capital. In concrete economic 
terms, a major consequence of the new policy was the giving up of the policy of import-
substitution and relying on export-led growth strategy. 
Further policies announced in 1975-76 included approval of additional capacity as an instrument 
in the process of modernisation, de-licensing of industries, automatic expansion of capacity up to 
25 per cent over a period of five years in a few engineering industries (Marathe 1986). State 
owned sector was no longer conceptualised as an engine of growth; rather its role was 
understood as one of facilitating private sector's growth.  
Again, in 1977, continuing with the policy of liberalisation, further relaxations were made. 
Stating the inadequacies of the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution, this policy intended "to 
remove the distortions of the past so that genuine aspirations of the people can be met within a 
time bound programme of economic development" (Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR), 1977, 
para 2). It emphasised on the need for the development and application of technologies, 
"appropriate to our socio-economic conditions" (IPR 1977, para 15). Some selected industries, 
hitherto reserved for the state enterprises, were now thrown open to large monopoly capital such 
as organic or inorganic heavy chemicals and industrial machinery. However, rhetoric of state 
owned sector as a real encumbrance to the growth of large monopoly capital was made. "Apart 
 14
from socialising the means of production in strategic areas, state owned sector provides a 
countervailing power to the growth of large houses and large enterprises in the private sector" 
(IPR 1977, para 21). The policy, therefore, proposed an "expanding role for the state owned 
sector in several such fields."  
As against the 1977, Industrial Policy Statement that was a reflection of the break up with the 
past, the Industrial Policy Statement issued in July 1980 was initially a reiteration of past 
policies.4 However, within two months, it not only allowed an automatic expansion of capacity at 
the rate of 5 per cent per annum over a period of five years for 19 basic and core industries 
(stated in IPR 1956) and 15 engineering industries (for which the automatic expansion had been 
allowed in 1975), but the existing capacity in these industries were also regularised (Marathe 
1986, p.128). 
The policy adopted in 1982 was a step forward towards the process of liberalisation. With the 
relaxation of the controls on both entry and expansion, the government effectively gave up the 
concept of socialism in India. The administered prices for pig iron were abolished and cement 
was partially decontrolled (Economic Survey 1982-83, pp. 25-30). The liberalisation trends were 
quite evident in electronics and telecommunications. The limit of automatic expansion of 
licensed capacity was raised to one-third of the total over a period of five years rather than just 
one-fourth as before. Another step-towards this drift away policy was liberalisation of 
manufactured imports. With the idea and justification for upgrading the Indian industry 
technologically; a number of foreign collaborations were approved. On an average, the number 
of foreign collaborations during 1980-84 (586) was more than double compared to those during 
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1970-79 (270) (Economic Survey 1982-83, pp. 25-30). This clearly revealed the changing mood 
of the government. 
In state owned enterprises, a visible change in the attitude took place. The emphasis was now 
more on efficiency and internal resource generation. At least 10 per cent rate of return was 
expected on the investments made by the state. A former Deputy Chairman of the Planning 
Commission noted in 1982, "By and large state owned sector has become an appendix to the 
private sector, meant to ensure its smooth running by providing the needed infrastructure and the 
basic production facilities. As a result instead of striking a path of its own, the state owned sector 
has to subordinate itself to the logic and requirements of the private sector" (Lakdawala and 
Kurien 1982). 
Therefore, this period of 1966-84 culminated in a total transformation in the economic policy. 
The economy was made predominantly dependent upon market forces rather than on the state. A 
transformation of a mixed economy from instrumental-socialist to instrumental-capitalist was 
patently underway (Mehta 1989, p.356). However, all this was being done under the popular and 
prevalent image of the government being socialist, "the government was not averse to being seen 
as acting, even though still not proclaiming, as if it were building a capitalist system" (Mehta 
1989). Thus, in order to legitimise the activities of the government, the melodrama of socialism 
continued with all its anti-poverty and social welfare proclamations. Moreover, the changes 
made did not appear very drastic and were prima facie technical a reduction in limit here and 
expansion of restrictions there. "The attempt, it seems, was to depoliticise economic decisions as 
far as possible" (Kohli 1989). 
Third Phase (1984-91) 
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The third phase of our study of economic policy had a better history to start with. The Fifth and 
Sixth Five-Year Plans' had recorded much better rates of growth. The growth rate that had been 
stuck at the average of 3.5 per cent per annum since the fifties, irrespective of the policy and 
leadership changes increased to 5.4 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively in the fifth and sixth 
plan periods. Similarly, a remarkable increase in the savings rate from around 10 per cent in the 
fifties and mid-seventies to 23.3 per cent in 1984-85 indicated a big structural break.5 
The industrial policy that was initiated in 1985 was the culmination of the process of drifting 
away, which started during the second phase of the economic policy in India. This policy, in the 
opinion of many analysts, marked the beginning of the 'total give in', of the earlier policy of self-
reliance. The steps taken for 'rationalising and restructuring' of industrial policy included de-
licensing of industries, broad-banding of production so that the industries can make rapid 
changes in the product-mix, which are necessary to adjust to the changing conditions of demand 
and technology, increase in the minimum asset limit of MRTP companies from Rs. 20 crores to 
Rs. 100 crores, introduction of a new scheme of re-endorsement of capacity, in order to 
maximise the capacity utilisation. 
Another major shift in this policy was the replacement of the system of direct physical controls 
by indirect controls. Hence, instead of the policy that relied more on tariffs and tax mechanisms, 
a new long-term fiscal policy was adopted that sought to simplify the tax structure through 
MODVAT (Modified value-added Tax). Warning against the system of physical controls, which 
in official vocabulary had been branded as socialism in India, K.N. Raj (1985) observed that over 
the three decades the system had "ceased to perform effectively most of the functions, it was 
designed for" and "it had become a major source of political and bureaucratic corruption; and 
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was being used by powerful vested interests" (Raj 1985). He further pointed out that, "It was 
wiser, therefore, to rather abandon the dishonesty and hypocrisy of it all than mainstream 
pretences... and create needless delays and inefficiencies all around" (Raj 1985). 
A qualitative shift in the pattern of industrial growth was observed during this period. Industries 
like electronics, computers and computer software; telecommunication equipment etc. got the 
priority in this phase. State owned enterprises were asked to generate a substantial amount of 
funds internally in order to meet their investment needs and also to reduce their undue 
dependence on budgetary resources. 
While glorifying the achievements of the economy, it became platitudinous to speak of 
inefficiency, over-manning and low productivity in the state owned enterprises. A long chain of 
reasons was pointed out for this state of affairs. Examples are: bureaucratic control of state 
owned sector, bottlenecks of licensing, non-remunerative prices especially under the 
administered price regimes, increasing incidence of capacity under-utilisation, dwindling 
magnitudes of ploughed back profits, corruption in many different forms at many different levels 
(Sathe 1989). While recognising the class character of the various revolutionary and liberal 
parties and the lack of political will on their part, Raj (1985) pointed out that "perhaps the most 
important reason why they have not been able to grow, in the manner once hoped and expected 
that there have not emerged any political force in the country genuinely interested in making 
such enterprises yield adequate profits and savings of their own”(p.18).  He anticipated that the 
serious implication of such a situation would be a stronger case for private sector enterprises. 
Post 1991, Policy Regime 
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Since July 1991, the country has witnessed a major policy reform programme consisting of 
considerable deregulation of industrial sector as well as liberalisation of foreign investment and 
technology imports. The major steps announced in this new package included: abolition of 
industrial licensing in all the industries except for certain security-related and strategic areas; 
automatic expansion of capacity according to market needs for existing industries; removal of 
the restrictions on investment by MRTP and FERA companies; automatic approval for foreign 
investment up to 51 per cent of equity subject to certain high technology and high investment 
priority industries; and liberalisation of capital market6.  
While emphasising that the practice of mixed economy would continue, the new economic 
policy embarked upon a few concrete changes in the sphere of state owned sector operations. 
Examples are: reduction in the list of industries reserved for state owned sector from 17 to 8 and 
then to 6. By December 2002, however, the list included only three areas reserved for PSUs: 
atomic energy, minerals specified in schedule to atomic energy (control of production and use) 
order, 1953 and Railway Transport. The number of items in respect of which industrial licensing 
is required, reduced to 15; disinvestment in the shares of state owned sector enterprises to 
promote general public and workers' participation in their ownership; announcement of a new 
policy of National Renewal Fund (NRF) in order to deal with the problems of sick state owned 
enterprises; making them more autonomous and accountable for results through a system of 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In addition, automatic approval of foreign investment 
up to 51 % and foreign technology permitted for 35 priority industries, which account for about 
50% value added in the manufacturing sector and so on. The Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Plan 
documents also suggested many policy initiatives regarding restructuring, modernisation, 
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rationalisation of capacity, product-mix changes, privatisation autonomy, performance 
accountability and disinvestments policy7. 
Such policy shifts had generated a lively debate in India among the supporters of the 
liberalisation policy prescriptions and critics of the policy. The debate is still on; the emphasis 
however has shifted after almost a decade of policy implementation, and the assessment on the 
performance has started appearing. Now the stress is more on the market in association with the 
state, the latter being responsible for providing institutional and infrastructural set up. 
In sum the earlier phase of heavy state spending, policy of protectionism, for example on setting 
up of financial institutions and investing in basic infrastructural sectors, was thought essential for 
providing a congenial atmosphere to indigenous capitalists and to facilitate the process of 
accelerated development of the economy. However, the fact that, in due course, the growing state 
investment and regulation of the economy resulted in increasing bureaucratisation, corruption, 
concentration of economic power in few hands, caused many analysts to think in new directions. 
It was natural that growing internal contradictions and consequently the rising complexity of the 
system strengthened the lobby seeking a more liberal economic environment in the country, 
especially when the international aid agencies and the mainstream economic view insisted on 
such opening-ups. 
A perusal of the recent policy shifts has made it quite evident that a return to the radical regime 
of direct controls is now out of question. The role of the state is diminishing. For all practical 
purposes, the concept of state owned sector occupying the 'commanding heights' of the economy 
is abolished except for a rhetoric identifying it with the infrastructure and strategic industries of 
late. The role of the Planning Commission has faced a significant de facto decline. The 
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movement of denouncing socialism that started in many parts of the world has influenced our 
policy makers as well. In concrete terms, the concepts of mixed economy, socialism, planned 
development are being replaced by market friendly approach, liberalisation, globalisation, 
privatisation, and disinvestment and so on.  
Implications of Policy Changes for State owned Sector 
As explained earlier, the shifting government strands on the economy could not leave the state 
owned sector unaffected. Shifting posture itself was, however, rooted in insensitive assessment 
of state owned sector. Particularly after mid-80s, it had become a fashion in official circles to 
indulge in unrestricted vilification of the state owned sector. The state owned sector was widely 
criticised as inefficient and the private sector was considered the hope for the future. 
Discontentment about the performance of the state-owned sector of Indian Industry has become 
the routine practice. Many studies evaluated the performance differences between state-owned 
and private sector industry. One school of thought (Majumdar 1995) found the state owned 
sector less efficient compared to its private sector counterparts. It was established that despite 
accounting for a major chunk of the capital investment, the state owned enterprises are 
systematically only two-thirds as efficient as private sector enterprises. Yet another school of 
thought was of the opinion that state owned and private firms facing similar competitive 
environment do not display any efficiency differences (Caves and Christiansen 1980). Still 
another school of thought8 was of the opinion that despite state owned enterprises, on the whole, 
performing less than the potential and not up to the expectations, shortcomings of state owned 
enterprises have often been exaggerated. 
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In fact many studies have shown that ownership per se - state owned or private - is not the factor, 
which determines efficiency; it is rather the degree of competition. Thus, provided there is 
sufficient competition, there is no discrepancy in efficiency between privately and state owned 
enterprises (Williamson, 1969, 1970; Baumol, 1967; Alchian and Kessel 1962, Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn and Pejuvich 1972).  Therefore, in such enterprises where lack of 
competition is the major problem; a mere change of ownership might not lead to desirable results 
and improvement in efficiency. 
Stiglitz (1997) cites the extraordinary performance of state owned enterprises in certain 
provinces of China to make the point that economic success is possible even under conditions in 
which property rights are ill-defined. He makes the point that generally in all big firms, whether 
in the state owned or the private sector, managers enjoy considerable discretion. Since managers 
can appropriate only a small fraction of any improvement in productivity, in neither sector do 
managers have any incentive to design good incentive structures. Martin and Parker (1997) put 
forward a number of other reasons why the suggestion of superior performance implied by the 
property rights and public choice theories as explained earlier literally need not be taken at face 
value. They argue that it is too simplistic to suppose that state owned and private sector 
companies are two distinct categories, each with a particular organisational design and 
orientation.  
In Indian scenario Dholakia (1978), proved it in terms of total factor productivity. He constructed 
a time series of overall factor productivity of the state owned sector and the private sector 
separately from 1960-61 to 1974-75. The results have revealed that state monopoly capitalist 
enterprises have performed far better than the private monopoly capitalist enterprises. A. Ghosh 
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(1984) has proved it in terms of operating efficiency, physical norms of capacity utilisation and 
efficiency in the use of material and energy. Taking a few case studies, he found that Bhilai Steel 
Plant is as good as TISCO and Bokaro Steel Plant has a more efficient energy balance profile. He 
was of the view that if these plants are not making as much profit, as do the private sector plants, 
it is because of the exogenous policy constraints. 
Despite such studies offered by many scholars, the recent policy shifts have changed the balance 
in favour of private sector. It is worth noting that for, the first time in the planning history of 
India, the Seventh Plan (1985-90) proposed larger planned outlays for the private sector as 
compared to the state owned sector. Following Table 1 shows that the share of state owned 
sector in total investment has continuously declined since 1980s. The relative shares of the state 
owned and private sectors during seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth plans clearly signal the rising 
importance of the latter at the cost of the former.   
              Table 1: Share of State owned Sector in Total Investment 
Five Year Plans State owned Sector Investments 
(as % of total investment) 
 Projected Realised 
V Plan (1974-79)  57.6 43.3 
VI Plan (1980-85)  52.9 47.8 
VII Plan (1985-90)  47.8 45.7 
VIII Plan (1992-97)  45.2 34.3 
IX Plan (1997 - 2002) 33.0 29.5 
X Plan (2002-2007) 12.6 ------ 
Sources: Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plans, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Apart from this, some of the enterprises in this sector are already open to the market to mobilise 
funds for their investment. The Ninth Plan has divided state owned sector enterprises into three 
categories (i) profit-making PSEs; (ii) PSEs making marginal profits and losses; and (iii) PSEs 
incurring substantial losses. Accordingly all the PSEs have been put in the suitable categories. 
Disinvestment Commission, started in 1996, primarily to discipline PSEs and make them result 
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oriented, had been developed into a full-fledged Ministry for Disinvestment under the previous 
government, institutionalising the process of reforms and restructuring of PSEs9. 
The operations of state owned sector has resulted in a number of state failures such as over-
manning and low work ethics, leading to low capacity utilisation, over-capitalisation, political 
and bureaucratic interference stifling the ability to innovate, take quick and timely decisions, 
burden of taken-over sick units. Apart from this, a serious charge against the operations of state 
owned enterprise is that they were used for private purposes deliberately ignoring the objectives 
for which they were established (Chaudhri 1994). 
Once it has been established that privatisation of SOEs is no longer a choice but an imperative; 
the stage was set for privatisation of SOEs. Therefore any analysis of economic policy and state 
owned enterprises would be incomplete without going into the details of privatisation process 
and policies followed so far and its likely implications. Researchers have tried to analyse the 
private sector performance world over particularly after disinvestment. The empirical evidence, 
which is mixed, falls into three categories (i) Case studies. (ii) Cross-sectional comparisons of 
state owned and private sector performance. (iii) Statistical analysis of pre- and post-divestiture 
performance of enterprises (Mohan 2001). This mixed evidence is a warning against sweeping 
generalisations about the impact of privatisation. “In general, where privatisation is claimed to 
have delivered improvements; but given the methodological shortcomings of many of these 
studies, they should be taken into consideration with a pinch of salt” (emphasis added) (Mohan 
2001). 
Privatisation of State Owned enterprises: Trends 
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From 1991 to 2000, the emphasis of Indian privatisation was on disinvestment through 
offloading of government’s shares to the state owned or financial institutions. During this period, 
the government offloaded shares in as many as 39 state owned enterprises. However, since 
March 2000 emphasis has increasingly been on strategic sales of identified state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Strategic sale refers to outright transfer of control in SOEs to private 
management. This normally involves the sale of 26 per cent or more of government equity to a 
private party. Table 2 briefly summarises the amount realised and the number of SOEs 
disinvested or privatised till date. 
Table: 2  Actual Disinvestment from April 1991 till November 30, 2003 
     Sale of shares – 
1991-92 to 1999-2000 
Strategic sale 
1999-2000 till date 
Total 
1  No. of Companies  39 * 36 * 68 * 
2  Equity sold (Rs. million)  23475 8940 32415 
3  As % of total equity of central Govt. 
and holding cos. (as on march 2000)  
3 % 1.13 % 4.13% 
4  Total Receipts (Rs. million)  195730 113440 309170 
Note: * Seven companies are common in both modes        
Source: Govt. of India; Department of Disinvestment: manual, 2003 
 
Modern Foods Industries limited (MFIL) was the first SOE to be strategically sold. The second 
SOE that was strategic sold was Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO). Fifty one per cent of its  
  
Source: Based on the data from Department of Disinvestment: Manual 2003 
Fig.1 Proceeds from Disinvestment (Rs. Mn)
36890
24240
14908
11537
8265
4450 4441
2425
6284
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
VSNL MUL IPCL IBP BALCO HZL ITDC HCIL OTHERS
Rs. Mn.
 25
 
shares were sold to Sterlite Industries for Rs 5,515 million. Following this sale, the government 
was quick to proceed with strategic sales in important firms by divesting 51 per cent of the 
shares in Computer Maintenance Corporation (CMC) to Tata Sons and 74 per cent of the shares 
in HTL, PPL and Jessop (for Rs 550 mn, Rs.1520 mn, Rs. 180 mn) to Himachal Futuristic 
Corporations, M/s Zuari Industries & M/s Ruia Cotex Ltd respectively (Govt. of India, 2003). 
 
So far since 1999, 36 central SOEs have been strategically sold. Of these, nineteen are hotels of 
Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) and three are hotels of Hotel Corporation of 
India Ltd. (HCIL) Together, these hotels have contributed Rs. 6,866 million towards divestiture 
or disinvestment proceeds. For all the nineteen hotels, 100 per cent of the equity was sold (Naib 
2004). In terms of  individual  sales, as shown in Fig 1, maximum proceeds (Rs.37 bn) were 
collected by selling 25 per cent of the equity in VSNL , followed by the contribution made by 
selling 27.5 per cent equity of Maruti Udyog-MUL (Rs24 bn), and by Indian Petrochemicals-
IPCL( Rs 15 bn). 
Implications of the Policy of Privatisation of State Owned Enterprises. 
The whole process of privatisation of SOEs  is not without issues and debates. From the very 
beginning the policy makers were cautious in the wake of vehement opposition of this idea of 
privatisation of SOEs. In how far it has been able to live up to the expectations and contribute 
productively to the growth of the country. A critical appraisal of this process raises many 
questions. 
The foremost is issue of the methodology adopted for privatisation. The government has 
preferred under the ministry of disinvestment strategic sales with transfer of management as 
 26
against a policy of market sale of shares in small lots. Researchers have referred to it as a lack of 
democratic privatisation in Indian scenario. In fact many researchers have gone to the extent of 
comparing the whole process of privatisation in India to that of other countries like UK and 
France. “This process is against the policy of privatisation adopted in UK, which has introduced 
innovations to market the shares of British Telecom to new buyers. Such a policy has also 
resulted in the widening of capital market in UK” (Naib 2004). 
Table 3 Disinvestments during 1991 – 2003 
Year 
 
No. of SOEs 
in which 
equity sold 
Target receipt 
for the year 
(Rs Mn.) 
Actual 
receipts 
(Rs. Mn.) 
%realised 
vs. 
targeted 
1991-92  47 25000 30380 121.5 
1992-93  35 25000 19130 76.5 
1993-94  0 35000 0 0 
1994-95  13 40000 48430 121.1 
1995-96  5 70000 3620 5.2 
1996-97  1 50000 3800 7.6 
1997-98  1 48000 9020 18.8 
1998-99  5 50000 53710 107.4 
1999-00 4 100000 18290 18.3 
2000-01 4 100000 18700 18.7 
2001-02 10 120000 56320 46.9 
2002-03 6 120000 47770 39.8 
Total   
1991-2003 
68 783000 309170 39.5 
 
          Source: Department of Disinvestment, manual 2003 
As Table 3 shows that in the Indian context, it is a matter of concern that the amount realised 
through disinvestment has fallen far short of the amount targeted. The total amount realised 
through disinvestment from 1991 to 2003 was Rs. 309 billion against a target of Rs. 783 billion 
leading to an average under subscription of more than 60 per cent.  
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Fig. 2: Disinvestment Proceeds(Tearget vs. Realised) 
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The disinvestment proceeds (Target versus realised) is shown in Fig. 2. As the figure shows, 
there is a large gap between the revenues planned to be raised and the amount actually raised. In 
fact except for the years in 1991-92, 1994-95 and 1998-99; in no other year could the 
government realise revenues greater than the targeted level of disinvestment. The evidence, 
however, is that the proceeds of the previous financial year that were announced in the month of 
March during that year, which could only be realised in the subsequent financial years formed 
the basis of higher proceeds in these years particularly, 1994-95 and 1998-99. As the figure 
shows that in the years preceding 1994-95 and 1998-99; the proceeds realised were nil or very 
few.  On an average only 39 per cent of the amount targeted could be realised in the 12 year 
period from 1992 to 2003. 
These large gaps in the targets and actual achievements speak volumes about the internal 
criticism of this policy of privatisation. The government had to go slow on this aspect. Many 
studies emerged on the gradualism in the privatisation process in India. (Kapur and Ramamurti 
2002; Ahluwalia 2004). Researchers have tried to give pros and cons with the gradual process of 
privatisation. They were of the view that while gradualism has disadvantages like sufficient time 
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for critics to put forward their arguments; deteriorating performance of SOEs particularly in 
India (an opposite view is given by Yarrow, 1992 for British SOEs); shows unwillingness of the 
government and may have negative impact on the shares of SOEs in the market. The gradual 
process of privatisation also increases the chances of favoritism to self interested and rent-
seeking politicians, bureaucrats and labour unions. Therefore, given these arguments 
privatisation of SOEs as such was not going to overcome some of the drawbacks of SOEs at least 
in near future. 
However, the other view that gradualism has its own advantages as the government can learn 
from experience and change the policy accordingly was also put forward. It also gives the 
opportunity to the government to establish necessary regulatory framework first before actually 
disposing off SOEs. It gives policy makers time to generate support for itself. Moreover, since 
each state owned enterprise has its own set of problems, which are required to be taken 
separately case-by-case both at the policy level and at the implementation level a policy of 
gradualism towards privatisation works as a boom. 
Another major issue that needs special attention is financing of budgetary deficit through 
disinvestment proceeds. At the time of launching a policy of disinvestment in July 1991, a three 
field objective was envisaged, that is, to raise the resources, to encourage wider public 
participation and to promote greater accountability. However, the statement given after is that the 
primary objective of disinvestment is to mobilise non-inflationary resources for the budget. 
Privatisation program began as a divestment program, whose aim seemed to be merely to reduce 
the government’s holdings by up to 20 per cent, principally to raise resources to plug the budget 
deficit. Accordingly, the program was labeled “disinvestment” and the term “privatisation” 
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assiduously avoided. The idea was to divest the amount up to 49 per cent. Since this would still 
leave the government with majority ownership, the fundamental character of the enterprise 
would be unchanged, while on the other hand even more resources could be mobilized to plug 
the budget deficit, which at the onset of the reforms exceeded 9 per cent of GDP.  
This makes it necessary to have a closer look at disinvestment proceeds and its relationship to 
fiscal deficit. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 3. The table reveals that the earnings (theough 
SOEs disinvestment) realised since 1991-92 are amount to Rs. 309 billion, while the fiscal deficit 
is equal to 10336 billion. This means on an average 3 per cent of the fiscal deficit has been 
financed through sale of SOE equity. The trend line in the figure shows that over the years the 
disinvestment as a per cent of fiscal deficit is declining. Therefore one can conclude that current 
level of disinvestment is of limited use for the fiscal deficit and is not a reconstruction.  
Table: 4 Disinvestment and Fiscal Deficit 
Year Disinvestment 
(Rs. Mn.) 
Centre’s Gross 
Fiscal Deficit 
(Rs. Mn.) 
Disinvestment as 
% of Fiscal 
Deficit 
1991-92 30380 363250 8.4 
1992-93 19130 401730 4.8 
1993-94 0 602570 0 
1994-95 48430 577030 8.4 
1995-96 3620 602430 0.6 
1996-97 3800 667330 0.6 
1997-98 9020 863450 1.0 
1998-99 53710 1133480 4.7 
1999-00 18290 1047170 1.7 
2000-01 18700 1188160 1.6 
2001-02 56320 1409550 4.0 
2002-03 47770 1454660 3.3 
Total    
1991-2003 
309170 10336730 3.0 
 
Source: Govt. of India; Department of Disinvestment: manual, 2003 and Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Source: as given in table 4 
 
Another important aspect that has policy implications is employment. Researchers have given 
arguments for and against employment implications of the liberalisation policy adopted in 1991 
in favour include competition will improve efficiency and this productivity of labour it will have 
a positive impact on employment (Joshi and Little, 1996). The changes in the growth pattern 
towards more capital intensive and a policy of privatisation may work towards worsening of the 
employment situation, (Ghosh, 1995, Dutt, 1997). 
Therefore it is interesting to know the employment implications of privatisation especially in the 
background of a famous case of strategic sale of BALCO in 2000 to a private party. In India the 
policy of disinvestment has been looked upon with skepticism10.  
The public sector in India until the late 1980s played a fundamental role in the development of 
the economy. It accounted for almost 70 per cent of the total employment in the ‘organised 
sector’. Despite the process of liberalisation in early 1990’s, the public sector continued to 
account for a large per cent of total employment in the organised sector. However, its share 
marginally declined from 71.2 per cent in 1990 to 69 per cent in 1999 (Public Enterprise Survey, 
Various Issues). 
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A glance at the level of employment in the 240 SOEs in terms of employment in the disinvested 
and non disinvested SOEs for the period 1981 to 2000 shows that the rates of growth of 
employment in the SOEs, divested SOEs and non divested SOEs were 15.15 per cent, 19.16 and 
11.3 per cent respectively for the period 1981 to 1991. The corresponding figures for the post 
reform period (1991 to 2000) were minus 17.5 per cent, minus 17.8 per cent and minus 17.4 per 
cent respectively. This implies that the decline in employment in the post reform era was almost 
the same for the three categories. Moreover, the share of employment in disinvested SOEs to 
total SOE employment remained at 27 per cent in the 10-year period. This indicates that even 
though the absolute number of people employed in disinvested SOEs decreased from 0.6 million 
in 1990-91 to 0.51 million in 1999-00, it may have nothing to do with the policy of 
disinvestment per se (Public Enterprise Survey, Various Issues). 
One major weakness of privatisation was lack of strategy on the use of the proceeds of 
disinvestment or privatisation. The money was used basically to plug the fiscal deficit. But as the 
analysis shows even that was minuscule. A better strategy would have been to earmark 
privatisation revenues ex ante for social sector and pro poor expenditures. The present 
disinvestment policy mentioned in the National Common Minimum Program May, 2004 does 
mention about the change in the policy whereby government expressed the need for selective and 
strategic focus on the focus of privatisation of SOEs. While maintaining that government will not 
encourage monopolies but rather prefer competition; the transparent and consultative case-by-
case method is proposed to be adopted. 
In 2005 govt. decided to constitute a National Investment Fund into which the realisation from 
the sale of government shares in profitable SOEs would be chanalised. The objective of the fund 
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will be to invest those proceeds in social sector projects and also use such funds to revive 
selected revivable profitable state owner enterprises. Given universality of the problems at the 
implementation level of each and every programme and scheme, the results of such a policy, 
however, are yet to be seen. However the big question still remains that whether a policy of 
disinvestment of profit making SOEs will be followed or there will be a change in it? 
Disinvestment of such SOEs in Indian scenario, works as a disincentive for such enterprises as 
their efforts of earning profits are disregarded. The disinvestment of BHEL in May, 2005 is an 
example of this. A sale of worth 10 per cent shares to the market leaves 57 per cent with the 
govt. However, the enterprises are under constant threat of selling more shares and this works as 
disincentive for future performance. On the other hand the experience shows that given the right 
kind of environment leads to improved performance of the enterprises.  The case of  Hindustan 
Copper, which had been running at a loss for the past seven years and a half years, made a turn 
around in 2004-05 and posted a net profit of Rs. 52 crores against a projected loss of Rs. 67 
crores. Similarly Mineral Exploration Corporation achieved a net profit of Rs. 244 lakhs after a 
gap of 14 years11. 
                                                 
NOTES 
1 Kalecki, "Theory of Economic Dynamics", in Kalecki (1972) 
2 James O'Connor, (1973). p.6. While suggesting the functions of the state he argues that "A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to 
help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes, looses its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and support". 
3 Guidelines to Industries, (1974-75). Government of India, New Delhi. 
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4 "Because of the change in the ruling party from Janta government to Congress government at the Centre in 1980. In fact, the document was an 
aggressively political document which, refused to accept any inadequacies in the earlier framework of policy or its implementation." S.Marathe, 
(1986). p.123.  
5 Mid-term Appraisal, "Seventh Five Year Plan", Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, p.9. 
6 Economic Survey, (1991-92). Part II, Sectoral Developments, Government of India, New Delhi, and Economic Survey, (1992-93). Government 
of India, New Delhi. 
7 Ninth Five Year Plan, (1997-2002). Vol. II, Planning Commission, Government of India, New Delhi. 
8 See Nagaraja, (1991) ‘Public Sector Performance In The Eighties: Some Tentative Findings,’ Economic and Political Weekly, December 14, 
26(50): 2877-83. Chaudhuri, (1994) ‘Public Enterprises and Private Purposes’, Economic and Political Weekly, May 29, .22:1338-47. 
9 Ninth Five Year Plan, (1997-2002). op.cit. pp.583-601. 
10 The strategic sale of BALCO in 2000, to a private party was met with a lot of resistance from the workers. They went on an indefinite strike, 
which lasted for over 60 days. They allowed Sterlite Industries (the new employers) entry into the premises only when the latter agreed not to 
retrench a single worker. Given this, the focus of this sub-section is specifically to examine the impact of disinvestment on employment levels in 
the Indian SOEs. 
11  Hindu, Saturday, June 4, 2005. p.15 
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